Shock Therapy in Poland: Perspectives of Five Years by Sachs, Jeffrey D.
Shock Therapy in Poland: Perspectives
of Five Years 
JEFFREY SACHS 
THE TANNER LECTURES O N  HUMAN VALUES 
Delivered at 
University of Utah 
April 6 and 7, 1994 
JEFFREY SACHS is Galen L. Stone Professor of Interna- 
tional Trade at Harvard University, Faculty Fellow at the 
Harvard Institute for International Development, and a 
Research Associate of the National Bureau of Economic 
Research. He was educated at Harvard University, where 
he received his Ph.D. in 1980. Sachs serves as an economic 
advisor to several governments in Latin America, Eastern 
Europe, the former Soviet Union, and Asia, and has also 
been a consultant to the IMF, the World Bank, the OECD, 
and the United Nations Development Program. He is a 
member of the Harvard Society of Fellows and the Fellows 
of the World Econometric Society. His numerous pub- 
lications include Poland’s Jump to  the Market Economy 
(1993), Macroeconomics in a Global Economy, coauthored 
with Felipe Larrain (1992), Peru’s Path to  Recovery, co- 
authored with Carlos Paredes (1991), Global Linkages: 
Macroeconomic Interdependence and Cooperation in the 
World Economy, coauthored with Warwick McKibbin 
(1991), and Economics of Worldwide Stagflation, coau- 
thored with Michael Bruno (1985). 
The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe in 1989 and in 
the Soviet Union in 1991 are watershed events in world history. 
Naturally, the real import of these monumental events has been 
especially hard to judge in their immediate aftermath. Each suc- 
ceeding year, we gain important new perspectives on their mean- 
ing. This is certainly true in the economic realm, where debates 
about the transition from communism to market economy have 
been especially lively and contentious. 
As the economic advisor to the Solidarity movement in Poland 
in 1989, I urged Poland to undertake a rapid transition to “nor- 
mal” capitalism, on the model of Western Europe. When the first 
post-Communist government in Poland came to power in August 
1989, the new economic leader, Deputy Prime Minister Leszek 
Balcerowica, adopted a radical strategy for the rapid transforma- 
tion of Poland to a market economy. This strategy has subsequently 
won the somewhat misleading sobriquet of “shock therapy.” The 
strategy has been widely debated since its inception in Poland on 
January 1, 1990. It has been adopted, in modified form, in much 
of the rest of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, includ- 
ing Russia after 1991.1 (For an earlier description of Poland’s 
reforms, see Sachs 1993. For a conceptual overview of “shock 
therapy,” see Sachs 1994c.) 
With five years of experience of economic reform in Eastern 
Europe, the strategy can be more clearly understood and evaluated. 
The strategy seems to be winning the test of time. Not only have 
1 My own direct role as economic advisor to the post-Communist governments 
has included Poland, 1989-91; Yugoslavia, 1989-90, before its breakup; Slovenia, 
since 1991; Russia, 1991-94; Estonia, 1992; Mongolia, since 1991; Kyrgyzstan, 
1993. In addition I have led several cross-country studies of the reforms, for the 
World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER) of the United 
Nations, in Helsinki, 1989-92; the National Bureau of Economic Research, 1992- 
93; and the Harvard Institute for International Development (HIID),  since 1993. 
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the early “shock therapy” countries — especially Poland and the 
Czech Republic — outperformed most of the other countries, but 
the idea of radical, comprehensive transformation to a market econ- 
omy is increasingly being adopted in countries that earlier shunned 
the strategy. The newly elected president of Ukraine, Leonid 
Kuchma, recently declared his intention to lead such a reform effort 
in his country. 
The passage of five years has been particularly important in 
placing the events in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union 
(hereafter EEFSU) in a clearer international context. In the eco- 
nomic dimension, we can see that the changes in the post-Communist 
countries of Eastern Europe and EEFSU are part of a powerful and 
deep trend of global economic integration. “Globalization” was 
of course already apparent in 1989, but the strength of the forces 
of global integration are even more clear today. 
Shock therapy, in the sense of a rapid, comprehensive, and far- 
reaching program of reforms to implement “normal” capitalism, 
makes particular sense in view of the global trends. The world 
economy is undergoing a process of “deep integration,” in which 
countries are linked not merely by international trade, but also 
through networks of production, finance, and shared economic in- 
stitutions. Almost no country in the world dares to stand aloof 
from these trends. 
For countries that have been cut off from the world economy 
for decades, such as Poland and the other post-Communist coun- 
tries, it makes special sense to deepen the new links with the global 
market economy as rapidly as possible. This is for three main rea- 
sons. First, the global system provides an invaluable road map 
for reforms. Second, the global system provides an opportunity to 
borrow technology, capital, and management techniques, to help 
catch up economically after decades of falling behind. Third, with 
many other countries and regions also trying to rejoin the world 
economy, the post-Communist countries are in international com- 
petition for capital, foreign direct investment, and export markets. 
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Going slowly means ceding necessary investment and markets to 
other countries and regions. 
This paper reviews the basic logic of the “shock therapy” ap- 
proach, both in general conceptual terms and in specific applica- 
tion in several countries. Why was it adopted ? How has it worked ? 
What are the real social costs to reform, and how can they be held 
to a minimum? How can reformers avoid becoming dangerous 
“social planners,” substituting a new unrealistic vision for the old 
failed Communist vision? And, finally, what are the real economic 
prospects for the post-Communist countries, and how do those 
prospects depend on actions of the Western countries as well as 
the reforming countries themselves ? 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1989 
The leaders of the Revolution of 1989 in Poland, Czechoslo- 
vakia, and other countries in Eastern Europe had an outward- 
looking agenda from the start. They saw the revolutions in their 
countries as the opportunity to rejoin the mainstream of Western 
Europe. The great rallying cry of 1989 was “Return to Europe.” 
When I first made my own economic proposals for Poland in the 
summer of 1989, they were billed by Polish Solidarity leaders and 
the media as the chance for Poland to become a “normal” country 
in Europe in a short period. 
This was the main reason why radical, comprehensive economic 
reform measures could be acceptable in Poland and the other coun- 
tries of the region. The politicians and the general public under- 
stood intuitively that a “shock therapy” approach was not simply 
another utopian scheme of economic reform, but rather was a quick 
route to a relatively clear target. In 1989, that clear target was 
Western Europe. There was already a general, if unexpressed, con- 
sensus in the society that whatever would reintegrate these coun- 
tries fastest with Western Europe should be adopted. 
While “shock therapy” has been attributed to the technocrats, 
it was Poland’s political leaders in Solidarity that insisted on the 
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approach. They understood that the collapse of communism gave 
an opportunity for decisive steps of reintegration with Western 
Europe and that these steps should be taken as rapidly as possible. 
When one of the Solidarity leaders asked me to prepare a draft 
economic reform plan in July 1989, his instructions were for me to 
be radical in conception, indeed to formulate a plan to “jump to a 
market economy.” I, of course, had been urging a similarly radical 
approach in previous months and believed it to be technically 
feasible. 
Shock therapy has been widely attacked by many intellectuals 
as being yet another “constructivist” system of social engineering, 
trying to replace one dogma with another. This is mistaken, and 
practical politicians could already see the difference in 1989. 
Whereas Lenin had also advocated a kind of “shock therapy” in 
1902 in his fateful and disastrous What Is to Be Done? his version 
of “shock therapy” was to create a new world that had never 
existed. Poland’s shock therapy was relentlessly down-to-earth by 
contrast. The main idea was to create institutions of the kind al- 
ready in existence, and with proven merit, in Western Europe. 
Leszek Balcerowicz said it best, when he declared in 1989, “We are 
too poor to experiment. If the rich countries want to experiment, 
let them. For us, it is better to take proven models.” 
While the 1989 revolutions were outward-looking from the 
start, there is one sense in which the outward vision was too lim- 
ited. The outward orientation extended to the United States and 
especially to Western Europe, but not much to other parts of the 
world. The great challenge, therefore, was seen as a regional one: 
to reintegrate with Western Europe. Such a priority makes emi- 
nent sense, but Eastern Europe cannot afford to stop there. Its main 
competitors, for example, in attracting foreign direct investment 
are in Latin American and East Asia, countries with comparable 
levels of living standards, infrastructure, and labor-market skills. 
Eastern Europe must therefore best understand how to position 
itself in the international, not merely the interregional, economy. 
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THE CONTENTS OF SHOCK THERAPY 
The people in Poland and the rest of Eastern Europe had a 
searingly realistic picture of the failures of Communist economics 
and the need for fundamental change of the economic system. 
Nonetheless, large parts of the population misjudged the detailed 
character of the economic crisis confronting their countries. In an 
important and troubling way, this led to serious misunderstandings 
in the dialogue between the East and the West after 1989. On a 
personal level, it took me some time to understand that my own 
words about the economic reforms were being interpreted in 
Poland in some unintended ways. 
For some of the Eastern European public, there was a straight- 
forward expectation that the change of the political and economic 
systems would catapult their countries to Western European life- 
styles and living standards. These people rightly understood that 
they suffered as the result of the economic system in place since 
1945, but they wrongly imagined that removing the system would 
be enough to undo the costs of forty-five years of misguided eco- 
nomics imposed by the Soviet Union. 
In retrospect, talk of a “jump” to the market economy and the 
journalistic label “shock therapy” played into these beliefs. After 
all, the metaphor of shock therapy suggested that one jolt of eco- 
nomic reform would reinvigorate the “patient” and allow the so- 
ciety to return to normal life. The problem, of course, was rather 
different. A change of economic system would make possible a 
gradual recovery of growth and a gradual convergence of living 
standards over the following decades. But no economic reform, 
however brilliant, could bridge an economic gap that had grown 
over decades, and indeed that had already been significant between 
Eastern and Western Europe before World War II. 
To understand the situation of the post-Communist economies 
it is useful to recognize that there are really three deep economic 
crises, not just one. The first, and most widely recognized and dis- 
cussed, is the systemic crisis: the need to change from a Communist 
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system to a market system. Even here, of course, there are serious 
debates and misunderstandings. In Poland today, there are still 
those who advocate a market system with extensive state owner- 
ship (sometimes called “market socialism” or a “mixed econ- 
omy”). Advocates of market socialism are rather naive in the 
faith that state enterprises can finally be made efficient and profit- 
able — despite all of the evidence to the contrary from the rest of 
the world, including Western Europe, Latin America, Africa, 
China, India, and the rest of Asia. 
The second crisis, distinct from the systemic crisis, is the finan- 
cial crisis of the post-Communist state. In almost all of Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union, governments are bankrupt or 
nearly bankrupt. Many governments, including Poland, Hungary, 
Bulgaria, the former Yugoslavia, and Russia, suffer from a heavy 
burden of foreign debt taken on by the old regime. Almost all 
governments suffer from huge budget deficits, as tax collections 
have plummeted and social demands have risen. The result is a 
life-or-death battle against inflation and default on debts. There 
are some exceptions, most notably the Czech Republic, which bene- 
fited from the fact that the old regime was too conservative and 
repressive to engage in foreign borrowing, thus leaving the new 
post-Communist government with a clean slate ! 
The third crisis, and the longest-term, is the crisis of structural 
adjustment. Even if there were no problem of the economic sys- 
tem, and even if the government were financially solvent, there 
would still be a deep crisis of living standards as a result of the 
structural characteristics of the Communist economies. Central 
planning under communism was not merely inefficient. It was in- 
efficient in particular ways. The central planners, under Soviet 
dictates, were oriented to building up heavy industry, and espe- 
cially military industry, at the expense of consumer industry and ser- 
vices. Thus, the EEFSU economies have vast capacity in steel, chem- 
icals, coal, and other heavy industries, but were virtually starved 
for services (banks, real estate, restaurants, even shops) in 1989. 
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The structural crisis cannot be resolved immediately by legisla- 
tive or political changes. Even after a market economy is in place, 
Poland will still suffer from having too much heavy industry. 
Workers in defunct heavy industrial enterprises will lose their 
jobs; regions will see sharp drops in living standards and employ- 
ment; and living standards will remain low for years as a result of 
the lopsided economic structure. This is the main sense in which 
“shock therapy” is a misleading metaphor. There is no way to 
shock the patient to economic prosperity. There is only the chance 
to give the patient a fresh opportunity to start rebuilding, acknowl- 
edging that restructuring and new economic development will take 
years, even decades, to bring to full fruition. 
The idea of radical economic reform is to address all three 
crises, recognizing that each poses a problem with a different time 
horizon for solution. The financial crisis is surely the most acute, 
but also the one susceptible to the fastest successful resolution. In 
1989, at the time of the Communist collapse, Poland suffered in- 
tense inflation, soon to burst out into full hyperinflation by October 
1989. (Economists define hyperinflation as inflation of more than 
50 percent per month. Inflation reached 54 percent per month in 
October 1989.)2 Moreover, the combination of large budget defi- 
cits, extensive printing of worthless paper currency, and Communist- 
era price controls meant that hyperinflation was combined with 
intense shortages in the shops and the burgeoning of black mar- 
kets. Farmers hoarded food, since the official food prices were far 
below the black market prices and far below the farmers’ expecta- 
tions of what the government would eventually have to pay to pro- 
cure the harvest. Fears of hunger in the main cities of Poland were 
widespread and realistic. 
The solution to hyperinflation and shortages is well known 
from twentieth-century economic history and from the recent ex- 
periences in Latin America in battling high inflation. A decisive 
2 Note that 50 percent per month compounded over 12 months is more than 
12,900 percent per annum! 
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break with high inflation and shortages requires a series of actions: 
cutting the budget deficit; stabilizing the foreign exchange value 
of the currency; raising market interest rates and tightening central 
bank credits to the government and to the banks; and, most impor- 
tant for ending shortages, removing artificial price controls that pre- 
vent the equilibrium of supply and demand at market-determined 
prices. This combination of measures was introduced in Poland on 
January 1, 1990, as part of a single package. 
The systemic crisis can also be addressed rapidly, but not on 
the same time horizon as the financial crisis. While the financial 
crisis can be brought under control within months, the systemic 
crisis requires years to address, even under the most favorable 
political conditions with the government and the public united 
behind the reform actions. The conversion from central planning 
to markets requires two sets of actions. The first, and administra- 
tively the easiest, is the elimination of central planning. Bureau- 
cratic interventions in the economy should be ended, and markets 
allowed to function freely. This involves, among other things, the 
elimination of price controls, licenses for international and internal 
trade, freedom of entry of new private firms into virtually all sec- 
tors of the economy, and the end of bureaucratic interventions in- 
side particular enterprises. 
The second set of measures involves the building up of new 
institutions of modern capitalism, including modern commercial 
law; an independent judicial system to enforce the new commercial 
law; and a private, corporate ownership structure to supplant the 
state ownership of enterprises. While the dismantling of central 
planning can be done literally in days or months, the building up 
of new institutions requires years. Even the fastest mass privatiza- 
tion of state enterprises, as undertaken in the Czech Republic and 
Russia, is a project of several years. 
If financial stabilization can be accomplished in the first year 
of radical reforms, and systemic transformation in the first five 
years, the structural change in the economy is a task of one to two 
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decades. Policy can ease the transition by implementing crucial 
measures of social protection for the vulnerable groups in the so- 
ciety or for those who lose their livelihoods as the economic struc- 
ture changes. Policy cannot, however, cause a sudden one-time 
jump in living standards when the underlying economic structure 
will remain lopsided and inefficient for years to come. The real 
growth in living standards will require the birth and development 
of millions of new businesses, as well as tens of billions of dollars 
of new investments that must be made over the course of years. 
THE RESULTS OF SHOCK THERAPY AFTER FIVE YEARS 
Early observers of shock therapy divided along extremes. Some 
people seemed to feel that a few months of bracing reforms would 
boost Eastern Europe back to Western Europe; these were inevi- 
tably deeply disappointed. Other people felt sure that shock therapy 
was sure to lead to disaster: starvation, social unrest, instability, 
a society divided deeply between haves and have-nots. These critics 
of the reform were fortunately proved wrong. If we can make any 
conclusions after five years, it is that the most radical reforming 
countries have indeed gone the furthest in restoring stability and 
laying the foundations for rising living standards. (For a recent 
comparative review of the Eastern European record, see Balcero- 
wicz and Gelb 1994.) 
Poland — the basket case of Eastern Europe in 1989 — has 
been the most dramatic illustration of the success of radical eco- 
nomic reforms. Poland achieved the earliest return to positive 
overall economic growth in the whole region, in 1992, leading all 
of Europe in economic growth in 1993 and perhaps 1994. Other 
radical reformers, such as the Czech Republic, Slovenia, and 
Estonia, are pulling far ahead of the pack as well. The gradualists, 
starting with Hungary, but including Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, 
and most of the countries of the former Soviet Union, are disap- 
pointments in economic performance. Several of these countries 
have started to intensify their economic reforms as a result. 
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If we look at the economic outturn in Poland in terms of the 
three crises — systemic, financial, and structural — we can learn 
a lot about the possibilities of economic change in the post- 
Communist countries. The financial crisis in Poland was quickly 
brought under overall control. Within the first months of 1990, 
the shortages had been eliminated and the inflation had been re- 
duced decisively, from more than 50 percent per month in late 
1989 to around 4 percent per month in mid-1990. Poland has con- 
tinued to battle with inflation rates that are high by Western Euro- 
pean standards, but with inflation of around 30 percent per year as 
of late 1994, we can say that the deep crisis of hyperinflation has 
definitively ended. 
The bigger surprise, perhaps, has been in the progress of sys- 
temic transformation. Poland took to a market economy like the 
proverbial fish to water. Poland’s commercial traditions of the 
prewar blossomed under the new economic freedoms. Hundreds 
of thousands of new businesses sprang up, especially in the long- 
suppressed service sectors. By 1994, approximately two-thirds of 
the work force was in the private sector, which now counted around 
2 million private businesses, most very small family firms. 
The legal infrastructure also developed rapidly, partly as a 
result of restoring Poland’s interwar commercial laws to the books 
and partly through the importation of new commercial laws from 
abroad. This importation came in three ways. Most importantly, 
there has been a concerted and deliberate attempt to harmonize 
Poland’s commercial laws with those of the European Union (EU), 
in order to facilitate Poland’s eventual membership in the EU. 
Second, the commercial law has evolved as the result of a slew of 
economic treaties with the United States and other non-EU coun- 
tries, in areas of foreign investment, taxation, and trade. Third, 
there has been a huge influx of foreign law firms, mainly to help 
service multinational firms opening operations in Poland. Eco- 
nomic law grows in the course of specific deal-making, with the 
[SACHS] Shock Therapy in Poland 277 
foreign law firms introducing commercial concepts into Poland’s 
evolving legal framework. 
The structural adjustments in the economy have of course led 
to the greatest stresses and controversy. Employment in the old 
state heavy industry declined markedly, often by 25-50 percent in 
particular enterprises. Many older workers chose early retirement, 
and others entered the unemployment queue. Young workers with- 
out skills have also had a difficult time finding jobs and have joined 
the ranks of the unemployed. Overall, measured unemployment 
rose to around 15 percent of the labor force before peaking, and 
seemingly has started to decline in 1994. Most Polish economists 
believe, however, that the unemployment is vastly overstated, since 
many people who collect unemployment benefits actually have 
work in the gray (informal) economy. Household surveys in 
recent years have suggested that actual unemployment rates are 
closer to 10 than 15 percent. This is still high, especially for a 
society not used to unemployment, but it is more in line with 
Western European averages (in mid-1994, the average EU unem- 
ployment rate was over 11 percent of the labor force). 
There have also been remarkable and positive structural adjust- 
ments. The service sector has boomed as the old heavy industry 
has declined. Private residential construction has picked up sharply 
in 1993 and 1994. Consumer goods industries are also developing 
rapidly, to take up the slack of declining heavy industry. Very im- 
portantly, Poland and most of the rest of Eastern Europe have 
demonstrated the capacity to compete in Western European mar- 
kets. The two-way trade between Eastern and Western Europe 
has burgeoned since the start of reforms and is thereby laying the 
basis of Eastern Europe’s accession to EU membership. 
Much of the controversy over shock therapy, especially in 
the early years, revolved around the impact on living standards. 
Changes in living standards from the central planning period are 
inherently difficult to measure. Official data do not adequately take 
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into account the huge social costs of shortages, queuing, and the 
lack of choice in consumer goods that characterized life in Eastern 
Europe before 1989. Large amounts of income earned in the new 
private sector go unreported. Ironically, measured living standards, 
according to the old style of data definition, seemed to show a 
marked decline of living standards at the start of radical reforms. 
After a few years of evidence, however, almost nobody believes 
that there has been a sharp decline in living standards. (For an 
early study showing the limitations of the official data, see Berg 
and Sachs 1992.) On the contrary, all of the evidence points to a 
veritable boom in ownership of consumer durables (cars, TVs, 
VCRs, washing machines, refrigerators, personal computers, and 
the like) once the availability of Western brands increased after 
1989. Household surveys also point to a rise in consumption of 
fruits and vegetables, meats, fish, and other high-protein items, 
and this rise seems to be widespread among socioeconomic groups. 
CONTINUING POLITICAL-ECONOMIC CONTROVERSIES 
If shock therapy is so successful, why has politics proven to 
be so turbulent in Poland and many other reforming countries? 
This is a difficult and important question. I can speculate on this 
issue, but without definitive conclusions. There is still the need to 
do more research on political attitudes using survey research data. 
The first point is surely that not all “shock therapy” countries 
have faced political turmoil. The Czech economic reforms, led by 
Prime Minister Václav Klaus, have enjoyed considerable public 
backing, at least after the division of Czechoslovakia into the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia. The Czech economic team has been 
nearly stable since 1990 and was returned to office in 1992 elec- 
tions with a large majority. This case demonstrates that radical 
reforms and political stability can be combined. 
In Poland, there has been considerable political turmoil, but 
this should not be confused with great swings in actual economic 
policy. The Balcerowicz Plan was controversial from the start, and 
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each election has been in some measure a referendum on economic 
reform. Nonetheless, while each succeeding government has come 
to office partly on the claim that it will “soften” the impact of eco- 
nomic reforms, the actual economic reform policies have been 
fairly consistent for five years. All governments have hewed to 
tight monetary and fiscal policies, market liberalization, and eco- 
nomic integration with Europe. There have been significant debates 
about privatization, which has been slowed down as a result, but 
almost all other areas of economic reform have continued to pro- 
gress at a rapid rate, and without any significant reversals. 
Nonetheless, it is important to ask why the public is not more 
enthusiastic about the reforms. After all, the shops are full for 
the first time in fifty years, and real consumption of consumer 
durables has boomed. I think that there are three main answers to 
this tricky question. First, as has already been mentioned, expecta- 
tions ran ahead of real possibilities. While foreign advisors such 
as myself claimed that Poland could “return to Europe” within five 
years, we meant that the economic system could be reformed, not 
that Poland could quickly become rich. In Poland, the common 
belief instead was that change of system would be enough to pro- 
voke an enormous jump in living standards. 
Second, the reforms have surely created a rise in anxiety levels, 
even if they have not resulted in a fall in actual living standards. 
In a quite tough sense, economic reform in the early years is a bit 
like a society-wide game of musical chairs. Once market forces are 
introduced, a significant proportion of the population must search 
for new forms of economic livelihood. The result of that search, 
to be sure, will be highly positive in the longer term for most of 
the workers, but the process of change can be deeply upsetting dur- 
ing the transition, and some workers will also end up as economic 
losers from the changes. This gives rise to what economists have 
come to call a “status quo bias,” in which the population might 
support a political program of the status quo, even in cases where 
a majority of the population is likely to benefit under continued 
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reforms. (The original theoretical presentation may be found in 
Fernandez and Rodrik 1991.) 
A simple numerical illustration might be useful at this point. 
Suppose, for purposes of illustration only, that the society is 
divided between 40 percent skilled workers and 60 percent un- 
skilled workers. Suppose that all of the skilled workers will bene- 
fit from economic reforms, and they know it. Suppose that 55 per- 
cent of the unskilled workers will lose from the reforms and that 
45 percent of the unskilled workers will benefit. Overall, 67 per- 
cent of the work force will benefit from the reforms: the 40 percent 
skilled workers and 45 percent of the 60 percent unskilled workers 
(27 percent of the labor force). Overall, 33 percent of the work 
force will lose from the reforms: 55 percent of the 60 percent un- 
skilled workers. Suppose also that before the start of reforms the 
individual unskilled workers can’t be sure whether they will be 
among the “winners” or the “losers.” Before the fact, therefore, 
unskilled workers will expect that they will be losers (55 percent 
losers versus 45 percent winners), and they will tend to oppose the 
reforms. 
Now, suppose that the reforms are put to a vote. All skilled 
workers will vote in favor of the reforms. All unskilled workers, 
however, will vote against the reforms, since they all fear that they 
are likely to be among the losers after the reforms are imple- 
mented. Therefore, the reforms will lose by a vote of 60 percent 
to 40 percent, even though 67 percent of the voters stand to benefit 
from the reforms! This is a reflection of the uncertainty of re- 
forms. All unskilled workers vote against the reforms even though 
almost half of the unskilled workers would actually benefit if the 
reforms were carried out. 
To finish this example, suppose that a decisive government 
carries out the reforms at the start of the post-Communist revolu- 
tion. Once the uncertainty is over, the skilled workers and 45 per- 
cent of the unskilled workers will be better off, and they will know 
it; 55 percent of the unskilled workers will be worse off, and they 
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too will know who they are. Overall, 67 percent of the workers 
will know that they have benefited from the reforms. If the re- 
forms are put to the test after they have been in place for a while, 
they will receive landslide support, even though they would be 
rejected by the same electorate before the start of the reforms! This 
paradox of the status quo bias helps to explain why reforms are 
very controversial at the start, but why they are maintained once 
they are set in place. 
A third reason for political controversy is that selected groups 
of the public are particularly well organized and politically mobi- 
lized to seek special privileges from the government. Thus, through- 
out Eastern Europe, pensioners account for a remarkably large part 
of the adult population, and, as in the United States, the pensioners 
are a very active and powerful political force.3 Similarly, the 
farmers are also well organized politically and highly mobilized to 
seek financial advantages from the state. The result is the electoral 
success of pensioners and farmers throughout the region, most 
strikingly in Poland. The electoral successes are magnified by the 
proportional representation system in the Eastern European parlia- 
mentary democracies, since relatively small and tightly organized 
political factions have decisive influence on coalition building. This 
coalition of farmers and pensioners is particularly susceptible to 
fiscal excesses, in response to constituent demands for higher pen- 
sions and greater agricultural subsidies. 
THE DIFFICULT CASE OF RUSSIAN REFORMS 
In almost every dimension, the Russian economic reforms, 
begun in earnest in January 1992, are more challenging and dif- 
ficult than in Eastern Europe (for an earlier overview, see Lipton 
and Sachs 1992). The scale of the country is nearly unimaginable: 
eleven time zones, perhaps 200 distinct ethnic-linguistic groups. 
The scale of political challenge is similarly profound: to move 
3 Roughly 32 percent of all Polish adults are on retirement pension or disability 
pension, in comparison with 18 percent in the United States. 
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from 1,000 years of authoritarian rule to democracy; from 75 years 
of home-grown communism to constitutionalism ; from empire to 
nation state; and from centralized power to federalism. On the 
economic front, the three challenges of reform — financial, sys- 
temic, and structural — are all present in Russia, and in acute form. 
The Russian state inherited a financially bankrupt treasury from 
the Soviet Union, with $70 billion of foreign debt and almost no 
foreign assets. The systemic challenge is even deeper than in 
Eastern Europe, since Russia has little market tradition of its own 
to draw upon. And the structural challenge is certainly the greatest 
of all, since so many of Russia’s vast resources were squandered in 
the military-industrial complex, and so much of Russia’s natural 
environment was despoiled by the ruthless Communist system. 
Russia also faced special short-run challenges of particular 
acuteness. On the monetary side, the breakup of the Soviet Union 
led to the establishment of no less than fifteen new central banks — 
one in each of the new successor states — all issuing credit in the 
same currency! This was obviously a recipe for disaster, and in fact 
the shared ruble currency among the successor states was one of 
the main reasons for high inflation in 1992 and 1993. Only after 
each of the states introduced its own national currency was it really 
possible to make lasting progress on stabilization. 
On the political side, the great problem was that Russia did not 
have a decisive constitutional breakthrough until December 1993, 
two years after the start of radical economic reform. The result 
was that Russia lurched from one confrontation to the next be- 
tween President Boris Yeltsin, intent on leading radical economic 
reform, and the Supreme Soviet, a legislative body held over from 
the Communist era and intent on slowing or reversing progress on 
radical reforms whenever possible. Thus, many crucial steps in re- 
form had to wait until 1994 to come to fruition. It is therefore 
far too early to draw conclusions from Russia’s reform experience. 
Russia has made important progress on all three areas of the 
economic crisis, but in almost no case has the progress been as 
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straightforward and clearcut as in Eastern Europe. Russia has been 
able to avoid hyperinflation, but it has not yet been able to tame the 
inflation; as of late 1994, inflation is still running at around 10 per- 
cent per month. The budget deficit remains very large, at around 
10 percent of GDP, and confidence in the Russian currency re- 
mains low. 
Russia has made greater progress in systemic transformation. 
Indeed, the most remarkable progress is in the area of privatiza- 
tion, where Russia successfully implemented an extremely radical 
and decisive strategy of mass privatization, based on the use of 
vouchers and free distribution of shares to workers and manage- 
ment. Around 80,000 small enterprises and 20,000 medium and 
large enterprises were successfully privatized in a two-year pri- 
vatization campaign led by the remarkable politician Anatoly 
Chubais. This first phase of privatization is already leading to the 
growth of stock exchanges throughout the country and more gen- 
erally to the development of capital markets. 
The problems of structural adjustment remain acute and are 
likely to pose grave problems for the society for years to come. 
In certain areas, there has been little progress in structural change. 
The disastrously inefficient state farms are a case in point. In other 
areas, such as the restructuring or closing of highly inefficient fac- 
tories in the far north or the coal mines in the great coal-producing 
regions, there are no easy choices, and there has been little progress 
to date. 
The gravest risk to the Russian reformers has been the weak- 
ness of the Russian state itself. This may seem paradoxical, since 
it was the “strong” Russian state that proved to be such a disaster 
for Russia and the world throughout this century. Nonetheless, 
since the demise of communism, the Russian central government 
has lacked the financial and political authority to enforce laws, pay 
the bills, stabilize the currency, combat crime, or sustain a basic 
level of public services (e.g., in health care). The situation reached 
its nadir in the fall of 1993, when the combination of intrinsic eco- 
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nomic problems and political conflict between the president and 
Supreme Soviet combined to make collapse an imminent possi- 
bility. After the violent confrontation between the president and 
Supreme Soviet, however, the situation drastically improved, with 
the adoption of a new constitution by referendum in December 
1993. Since then, the Russian government has been able to achieve 
a minimally acceptable level of authority and stability, and thereby 
to reestablish progress on crucial areas of reform. 
If one can draw any clear conclusions from Russia since 1991, 
it is that economic reform can work effectively, if politics gives the 
reforms time to take hold. Markets can flourish in Russia when 
they are allowed. The essential problem remains one of politics 
rather than economics per se. This, at least, is positive news and 
puts to rest some of the doubts expressed about the compatibility 
of Russian culture and the market economy. Russia will manage 
well with markets, if market reforms are given the chance. 
DOES CHINA PROVIDE A COUNTEREXAMPLE 
TO SHOCK THERAPY ? 
While Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union have been 
struggling to achieve financial stability and systemic change, China 
has been charging ahead in economic growth.4 Since the start of 
Deng Xiaoping’s market reforms in 1978, China has been the 
f astest-growing country in the world, averaging around 10 percent 
per year GDP growth. China’s reforms, seemingly, have been 
more gradual than in Eastern Europe. The state remains Commu- 
nist; there has been little privatization of industry. Does this sug- 
gest that China has landed on a reform strategy clearly superior to 
the “shock therapy” and other approaches in EEFSU? 
The answer is no. China differs so drastically from EEFSU that 
one cannot read China’s successes as pointing a better way for 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Consider the three 
crises I have discussed at length. First, China did not face financial 
4 This section is based heavily on Sachs and Woo 1994. 
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insolvency at the start of its reforms. Therefore, it was able to 
launch economic reforms without the need to make drastic cuts in 
the budget or drastic restrictions on monetary policy. As for the 
economic system, China was always less centralized than the Soviet 
Union, with much greater independence and initiative at the local 
and provincial levels. The most important difference, by far, lies 
in the third area: structural adjustment. 
The key distinction between China and EEFSU is that China 
was in 1978, and still is today, an overwhelmingly peasant agri- 
cultural economy. In 1978, more than 70 percent of the total labor 
force was in peasant agriculture! Only 8 percent of the workers 
were in state industrial enterprises, and only 18 percent of the 
workers were in state enterprises of all kinds (industrial and non- 
industrial). By contrast, only around 12 percent of the Russian 
labor force was in agriculture at the start of President Yeltsin’s 
economic reforms in 1992, and fully 90 percent of the work force 
was in some kind of state enterprise. 
These structural characteristics make a profound difference for 
the nature of economic reform and development in China and 
EEFSU. In China, there is no overwhelming need to close down 
old industries or to privatize the economy. Such steps would be 
very helpful, but they are not of decisive importance. Rather, for 
China, the decisive step is to free up the nonstate economy, so that 
rural workers can leave low-productivity agriculture and join non- 
state firms in industry. Thus, the main problem is to spur the flow 
of workers from agriculture to industry. Since peasant workers toil 
at subsistence wages, and without social protections, they are eager 
to leave this back-breaking work and to migrate to rural industry or 
to urban industries in the booming coastal provinces. 
In EEFSU, by contrast, there is no vast rural hinterland from 
which to recruit the employees of the new nonstate sector. Also, 
there is no way to leave the state sector intact, since it is highly 
inefficient and financially destabilizing. Thus, in Eastern Europe 
and Russia, it is necessary — even if politically difficult — to make 
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a frontal assault on the problems of the state sector, including re- 
trenchment, factory closings, and privatization. China’s “two- 
track approach” of permitting a nonstate sector while continuing 
to subsidize and protect the state sector simply cannot work in 
EEFSU, where the state sector traditionally employed almost all 
workers, not the 18 percent employed in the state sector in China. 
If China had made great progress in reforming the state sector, 
then it could provide important lessons for EEFSU. Alas, China 
has little to teach in this area. Despite the overall boom in the 
Chinese economies, the Chinese state enterprises are overwhelm- 
ingly loss-making and therefore present a tremendous financial 
burden to the rest of the society. I t  is estimated that, in 1994, 
roughly two-thirds of all state enterprises in China are in the red. 
These losses are contributing to inflation rates of around 25 percent 
per annum in China, which is very high by Chinese standards. For 
these reasons, lessons on restructuring and privatization of state 
enterprises are likely to flow from EEFSU to China, rather than the 
other way around. 
POST-COMMUNIST REFORMS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 
Five years after the start of Eastern Europe’s reforms, it is now 
more clear than ever that EEFSU’s return to the world economy is 
part of a deep global trend. The Communist countries were the 
most extreme forms of a more general phenomenon of economic 
policy in the developing world after World War II. Most of the 
developing countries, with the significant exceptions of a few East 
Asian countries, adopted a model of autarkic development, in 
which industrialization was to be fostered by cutting the home 
economy off from world markets, thereby protecting the domestic 
industry from international competition. Such a strategy could be 
seen throughout Latin America, Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union, Africa, India, China until 1978, and some other 
parts of Asia. 
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This inward-looking model failed not only in the Communist 
countries, but in the rest of the developing world as well. By the 
1970s, many Asian economies had already begun the switch to an 
outward-oriented industrialization strategy, based on the export of 
labor-intensive goods in the world markets. It took the Latin Amer- 
ican debt crisis in the early 1980s to reverse the policy course in 
most of Latin America. Similarly, it took a balance-of-payments 
crisis in India in 1991 to put an end to India’s decades-long closed- 
economic strategy. EEFSU’s reforms must be put in the context of 
the worldwide switch to global integration and free trade. I t  is not 
enough, for example, for Poland to seek to join Western Europe. 
It must also recognize that it is competing with middle-income 
countries in East Asia and Latin America for foreign investment 
inflows and for export markets. 
The worldwide character of the economic reforms is both 
heartening and disquieting for Eastern Europe. On the one hand, 
the fact that Latin America, India, China, and dozens of other 
countries are also following the strategy of market reform, trade 
liberalization, and privatization helps to confirm that the reform- 
ing countries of EEFSU are on the right track. On the other hand, 
the competition in world markets for international investment 
flows is fierce, and it is important that Eastern Europe not continue 
to lag far behind East Asia in attracting foreign investment. 
The early results of Eastern Europe’s competition for foreign 
investment are mixed. Foreign investment has risen sharply since 
1989, but it remains far below the levels of foreign investment in 
East Asia. Poland has been attracting roughly $1 billion per year 
in foreign direct investment flows, as well as several hundred mil- 
lion dollars per year in portfolio capital flows. By contrast, Singa- 
pore has been attracting roughly $5 billion per year in foreign 
direct investment alone, and Malaysia has been attracting like 
amounts. One of the problems for Eastern Europe is that its geo- 
political “place in the world" is still unsettled, as I explain in the 
next sec tion. 
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THE ROLE OF THE WEST 
After five years, we can see considerable progress in economic 
reforms in EEFSU. And we can see considerable evidence that the 
faster the reform measures are implemented, the better the out- 
come. And yet, important risks remain, in both Eastern Europe and 
the former Soviet Union. To an important extent, the remaining 
risks reflect the shortcomings of actions on the side of the leading 
developed economies of Europe, the United States, and Japan, rather 
than failures in the reform efforts in the post-Communist countries. 
The risks are different in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union. In Eastern Europe, the prospects for sustaining democracy 
seem solid, and economic reforms have reached the point of irre- 
versibility in most of the countries. Now the problem is not the 
risk of utter collapse, as it was in the early years, but rather the 
quality of economic performance. Will Eastern Europe now charge 
ahead economically, with high growth rates sufficient to begin 
closing the gap in living standards with Western Europe? Or  will 
Eastern Europe instead remain an economic backwater, lagging far 
behind in living standards and failing to attract the foreign in- 
vestment that could push the economies into faster growth? 
A lot will depend on the West, and on Western Europe in 
particular. Eastern Europe based its revolution on the “return to 
Europe.” This return is vital to the political, social, and cultural 
health of Eastern Europe, but it is also crucial for its economic 
health. And yet, Western Europe has so far remained vague and 
noncommittal on the central question of Eastern Europe’s “re- 
turn” : the timing and modalities of Eastern Europe’s membership 
in the European Union. While the countries of Eastern Europe 
have received general rhetorical commitments that they will even- 
tually be welcomed as EU members, they have not received any 
clear signals as to when that might occur. 
The costs of this delay have been high. The experience of 
Portugal and Spain in the 1970s and 1980s demonstrates clearly 
that EU membership was vital in enabling these two countries to 
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attract large flows of foreign direct investment, which in turn were 
needed to raise living standards and to modernize industry. In 
addition, membership in the EU was very important in sustaining 
the political momentum of economic reforms in Portugal and 
Spain. Therefore, Western Europe’s delay in embracing Eastern 
Europe’s membership in the EU is highly risky. It continues to 
deflect needed foreign investments to East Asia, and it risks under- 
mining the vital social consensus in favor of economic reform that 
has so far sustained the tricky and difficult process of change. 
The risks are different, and even more grave, with respect to 
the former Soviet Union. In the case of Russia and most of the 
other states (the Baltic States being the exception), democracy 
itself is not yet consolidated, and the economic reforms could still 
collapse in an outburst of hyperinflation, tax evasion, and crimi- 
nality. Therefore, it is still crucial to consolidate the basic direc- 
tions of reform. 
As I have stressed on many occasions, the West bears a major 
responsibility in this most crucial phase of democratization and 
market reform (see Sachs 1994a, 1994b, 1 9 9 4 ) .  Throughout the 
history of this century, fragile democracies facing deep financial 
crises have required international assistance to help pull them 
through the crisis. Foreign assistance cannot create growth or even 
sharply higher living standards. It can, however, bolster weak gov- 
ernments long enough for more basic economic reforms to take 
hold. That is the lesson of the Marshall Plan and of similar aid to 
Israel, Mexico, Poland, Turkey, and other countries in the past 
fifteen years. It is vital that the West apply this lesson to Russia 
and the other countries of the former Soviet Union before financial 
disaster takes away this historic opportunity for democratization 
and fundamental economic reform. 
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